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With film theory the “text” that is film has at times encountered diverse readings that account for potential 
relations to and of the subject. Marxism, feminism, formalism, structuralism, phenomenology and 
psychoanalysis have all offered positions of the subject (both film and its viewer) in relation to their discrete 
disciplinary borders. However, it may be that in terms of a film’s relation between theory and practice, the 
discipline of psychoanalysis has the most unresolved dispute. Clinically speaking, psychoanalysis treats the 
human subject and not a film text, and while it has been argued that there exists the possibility for film to be 
either analyst or analysand, a deeper ethical question is opened around practice. A clinical ethics of the 
subject suggests that in transference the analyst keeps her unconscious out of the session. This paper probes 
the possibility of such a reading of the textual filmic encounter that keeps open this ethical domain of 
psychoanalytic practice. Is it possible to encounter a film, to produce its reading, via the ethics of 
psychoanalytic practice? What would it mean to do an ‘analysis’ of film where one’s unconscious is kept 
professionally at bay? Does it even make sense to treat an engagement with film as if it were a clinical 
experience?  
 
This strategy brings into proximity questions of theory and practice, ethics and psychoanalysis in relation to 
the work of Joan Copjec on psychoanalysis, ethics and film. Her work on sublimation in relation to ethics and 
readings of filmic space will offer a register for my reading of P.T. Anderson’s There Will Be Blood. Her position 
that gathers together sublimation and invention will develop on from Lacan’s insistence on a difference 
between objects and themselves. In addressing the thematic of the conference Pathologies of Enjoyment this 
paper suggests a new pathological engagement with film and the subject through the absented unconscious of 
analysis itself. In doing so, this ‘reading’ aims at another ethical direction where the film / its unconscious 
speaks for itself. 
 
 
 
Introduction: Ethical Subjectivity in Levinas & Lacan 
My identity today comes from the place of the other that is filmic. I use the term filmic as a 
strategy for marking out a beyond of the encounter with film that is mediated by stories, 
characters, genres etc., that is often the case when the tools of psychoanalysis are applied to 
film theory and criticism. I will not be addressing a film in particular or films per se as 
though this proper name were adequate enough to contain the range of methodologies, 
styles, disseminating encounters in the service of the screen. Rather, I wish to probe the 
experience of being with film; being in screen space, in order to question a more originary 
space. That is, why is it that we endure the screen? How has it come to possess us spatially 
and temporally? This space of the other that is filmic, is rather a space between other and 
self, other and subject, which marks here a critical ethical import for a weaving across 
psychoanalysis and philosophy. Regardless of a filmic encounter or that with another subject 
in and out of the clinical setting, both encounters engage in productive forces within systems 
of representation and reproduction. Forces most often that are highly mediated and 
impartial. In bringing together the radical ethics of Emmanuel Levinas and the ethical 
practices of Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalysis, I hope to open up a possibility around the 
success of a vision as acknowledged failure; a failure that opens up onto a new discourse on 
being with the other that critically probes the violence inherent in vision that is more than a 
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harmless fantasy. Further, it is the work of Emmanuel Levinas that offers up a new way of 
seeing, which he nominates as a vision without seeing. This vision without seeing that brings 
to appearance our encounter with another finds correspondence in the ethics of 
psychoanalytic practice and which Simon Critchley connects from Freud’s writing on “the 
Thingly secrecy of the neigbour”; something which we will return to at the end of the paper. 
Whilst, it is certainly not an easy fit to bring Lacan and Levinas into proximity, and indeed 
only few writers have done so to date, I want to suggest that they identify a common formal 
structure to ethical experience, despite many insurmountable differences at the level of 
content. A common structure that I wish to thematise at the level of a resistance to the 
fantasy of visuality and appearances in terms full inscription. For Lacan, in his Seminar VII, 
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, ethics is articulated in relation to the order of the real:  
 
“My thesis,” Lacan writes, “is that moral law, the moral command, the presence of 
moral agency in our activity, insofar as it is structured by the symbolic, is that 
through which the real is actualised — the real as such, the weight of the real.” 
(p.20).  
 
The real is often depicted as appearance insofar as it is impossible to inscribe its full 
meaning; this performatively-speaking is the real. As Lacan states: the real is “that which 
resists, the impossible, that which always comes back to the same place, the limit of all 
symbolization”. Whilst we will return to this furtive place in more detail, this obscure gloss 
on the real in relation to the inherent link to the ethical structure coincides centrally to a 
Levinasian interstitial site of ethical resistance. 
 
Non-Indifferent Vision 
For expedience sake or lack of time, let us first return to the scene of filmic encounter to 
move through a domain of visuality or ‘visual arts’ that for many years has critiqued the 
problematics of representation and symbolic exchange. Further I would like to bring 
together these critiques through an examination of an ethics of the screen in terms of its 
disseminating potentiality to reach into mass-consciousness; to examine if you will the 
symbolic dimension of ethical subjectivity. 
 
So, how does the intervention of film develop the experience of being ethical? What is the 
experience of being ethical or point of resistance in encountering a medium that is saturated 
with rich symbolic language? Is there a politico-ethical responsibility at stake given the filmic 
dissemination reaches into the hearts’ of mass-audiences and into our public i.e. shared 
spaces?  
 
It is this latter question to which Hannah Arendt offered a partial answer to when in 1958 
she defined the democratic public sphere the “space of appearances” of that is, what 
phenomenology calls “stepping forth”. Arendt famously wrote:  
 
“The polis is not the city state in its physical location it is the organisation of the 
people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies 
between people living together for this purpose no matter where they happen to be. 
It is the space of appearance in the widest sense of the word, namely in the space 
where I appear to others and others appear to me. Where men make their 
appearance explicitly.” (Arendt The Human Condition, 1958: p.42). 
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Since then other political philosophers have tied the public space to appearance though not 
necessarily in so many words. In the early 1980s Claude Lefort, influenced by Arendt, 
introduced ideas, which have become the key concepts in the discourse of democracy. 
Concepts, which link the notion to appear to the declaration of rights.  
 
LeFort said that the hallmark of democracy is the disappearance of certainty about the 
foundations of social life beginning with the democratic revolutions of the 18th Century that 
destroyed monarchical power. And with the French and American declaration of rights the 
power of the state was no longer attributed to a transcendental source, such as God, Natural 
Law, self-evident truth. Now power derived from the people. Yet with the disappearance of 
references to an outside source of power an unconditional source of social unity of the meaning of 
the people vanishes as well. While the people are the source of power they too have no fixed 
meaning, no substantial identity. [Possibly add some Foucault here] 
 
Democracy says, Lefort is instituted and sustained by the dissolution of the markers of 
certainty. It inaugurates a history in which people experience a fundamental indeterminancy 
as to the basis of power, law and knowledge, and as to the basis of the relations of self and 
other.” (Lefort, Complications: Communism and the Dilemmas of Democracy (Columbia University 
Press, 2007, p.12.) 
 
The meaning of society; the basis of the relations between self and other is decided within 
the social world but is not imminent there. Rather democracy gives rise to community 
spaces; a realm of possible ethico-political interaction, which appears when in absence of a 
proper ground the meaning and unity of the social order is at once constituted and put at 
risk. Because the social order is uncertain in the deep sense of being founded on a 
groundless ground, and therefore impossible, it is open to contestation.  
 
So what is recognised in this community founded on a groundless ground is the legitimacy 
of debate or other forms of contestation (such as art or critical encounters) about what is 
legitimate and illegitimate. These forms of resistance or contestation are initiated with the 
declaration of rights, but the democratic invention deprives rights just as it has the people of 
a substantive foundation. Like the people, rights become an enigma, without objective 
guarantees, entangled with politics, their source isn’t nature but the human utterance of right 
and the social interaction implicit in the act of declaring. Through this interaction those who 
hold no position in the political community make an appearance. When social groups lay 
claim to new specific rights they join a long history of struggle against oppression. In 
declaring new rights they repeat the original democratic need for freedom and equality and 
also declare what Étienne de La Boétie1 calls ‘a universal right to politics’; The right to appear 
as a speaking subject in the public and communal sphere. The space of appearances, the 
shared space of community, appears then with declarations of the right to appear.  
  
 
Coming into Appearance; an ethics of exposure 
                                                
1 Étienne de La Boétie, The Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude, translated by 
Harry Kurz and with an introduction by Murray Rothbard, Free Life Editions, 1975. 
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As I said earlier, defining what it means to suggest an ethics of the screen encounter through 
a critique of the ethico-political question at stake in its disseminating potentiality; a 
potentiality that mediates a rich symbolic language in shared i.e. communal exchange, seems 
to suggest here that we are in a space of appearances. It is a space in which we appear 
collectively; not only because we often share viewing with others, let us call them an 
audience, and this term is appropriate for its consumerist connotation. And yet we also share 
the lives of others in existence within the diegetical and symbolic fabric of the film.  
 
So, to be engaged in filmic encounter is to appear but also, and this is ethically more 
significant, to be exposed to the appearance of others. The space of appearance idea, 
evidences a transparent relation between being ethical in a shared sense and to visuality and 
thus suggests an opening to some of the initial questions posed: How does the intervention 
of film develop the experience of being ethical? Is there a politico-ethical responsibility at 
stake given the filmic dissemination reaches into the hearts’ of mass-audiences and into our 
shared spaces?  
 
Indeed, the space of appearance implies a special and two-fold role for both those who deal 
with the production of images and the role of the viewer within this system of reproduction. 
That is, in terms of a deepening and extending of the space of an ethico-politico experience 
that brings into question the saturation of meaning and identity and furthers the encounter 
of otherness; of the invisible; the marginal to come into appearance. 
 
Here, however, we encounter a problem. For important strands of contemporary art and 
film theory and more broadly of intellectual thought have criticised vision, precisely because 
it is the sense that instead of welcoming others as other, tends to meet them in relation to 
make them disappear. Transforming the other into an object of knowledge, vision is 
mediated by a desire to reinforce the subject’s mastery as is thus triumphal rather than 
responsive. If then exposure to others lies at the heart of democratic politico-ethical life, the 
question of how our encounter with film, or in more broader terms, screen space (and let us 
not forget the sub-textual theme of the psychoanalytic session) develop the experience of 
this exposure, calls for still other kinds of questions:  
 
With what kind of vision shall we meet the appearance of others? Can our being with the 
screen help establish ways of seeing that does not seek to reduce the experience of exposure? 
What kind of vision overcomes apathy and overcomes this response to the suffering or 
differences of others? In short what is communal sight or vision? Before addressing these 
questions and as a caveat, my emphasis here on the communal is thought alongside a radical 
notion in line with philosophers such as Jean Luc Nancy’s inoperable community, Maurice 
Blanchot’s disavowable community and Giorgio Agamben’s coming community. Further it is a 
community that I want to emphasise does not fall into the realm of a public/private 
dichotomy and hence, I feel has some currency within the “private” space of clinical 
practice. Further the conceptual approach to ethics of Levinas of which we are about to 
introduce, is a conceptual framework that refuses to be an ethics based on the discourse of 
the master, but equally refuses the unsatisfactory option of what, David Ross Fryer states as 
“a modern and even postmodern ethics based on the reduction of the ethical to one’s own 
life” (Intervention of the Other: Ethical Subjectivity in Levinas & Lacan, New York: Other Press, 
2004: 5). It is beyond the modernist category self, and even the postmodernist notion of 
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subject is contestable and perhaps, his thought situates itself more comfortably in the current 
discourse of post-humanism.  
 
An ethics of appearance: The third party 
To return; the radical re-evaluation of ethics undertaken by the philosopher Emmanuel 
Levinas, offers I think some answers to these questions around what kind of vision shall we 
meet the appearance of others? A way of thinking about relations between vision, 
representation and the space of appearances that challenges triumphalist vision. For Levinas 
conceives of the other as an enigma rather than an object of knowledge. He is concerned not 
with the appearance of the I (eye le moi… check this spelling) … “Isn’t there something like a 
war inherent in this affirmation of oneself” he asks (Totality & Inifinity, p.12). But, rather, 
with the way I call myself into question when exposed to the appearance of the other. He 
calls the other person who appears to me, the face. What Maurice Blanchot has rightly 
described in his writings on Levinas “a curvature of intersubjective space’ (Totality & Infinity, 
291). But the face is more than the other person in the world. It manifests the other in the 
sense of that which cannot be made fully visible or knowable. The face is tricky territory in 
that it is a focus on the “non-phenomenon” of the face; that which cannot be contained in 
consciousness. As David Ross Fryer and Simon Critchley both pick up on, it is a shift in 
Levinas’s work from phenomenology to “ethical language”. One of the terms in Levinas’s 
ethical language is trauma, which we shall come to focus on in order to bring out the links 
between Levinas and the psychoanalytic dimensions of ethical experience. Let us say for now 
that for Levinas the ethical demand is a traumatic demand. 
 
Describing the other as that which approaches but cannot be reduced to a content, Levinas 
distinguishes what appears from what is fully seen. What is more, when the other appears, she 
is accompanied by something else, what Levinas calls the third party. The approach of the 
third party is not like that of an other person in an empirical event but rather an awareness 
that the other is never simply my other. Rather the other implies the possibility of others, for 
whom I am myself an other.  I am made to realise that the other does not merely exist for 
my sake. That my neighbour is also a neighbour to the third party and indeed that to them, it 
is I who am the third party. With the notion of the third party, Levinas enters the discourse 
of a non-dialectical relation; what he calls ‘relation without relation’ (Critchley 59). For the 
third party lifts the encounter with the other beyond the space of a dyad, and places it into 
space that only appears from a third-party perspective as equal, symmetrical and reciprocal 
from a neutral, third-person perspective that stands outside that relation. That is the relation 
can only be totalised by imagining myself occupying some God-like, third-person 
perspective outside of the relation. When I am within the relation, then the other is not my 
equal and my responsibility toward them is infinite. It is such a non-dialectical model of 
intersubjectivity that Levinas has in mind; hence ‘relation without relation’. The third party 
is, to quote Levinas, ”the whole of humanity, that looks at us”.  We might start to imagine 
that it is the screen space that takes up this place on the high-point of this inter-subjective 
curvature. And therefore the relation with the face, insofar as is it is always a relation with 
the third party, “places itself in the full light of the communal order”. The other’s (the film’s 
etc) approach bespeaks the social world, but what it tells me is that I cannot meet that world 
from a position of full understanding, the world is not mine. Levinas puts it like this “the 
presence of the other is equivalent to this calling into question of my joyous possession of 
the world”. Levinas dispossession of the subject of knowledge recalls the dissolution of 
certainty, that in the Lefort accompanies the collapse of the ground of the social.  
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Both Lefort and Levinas are philosophers of the enigma, of that which escapes 
comprehension and dismantles the subject. The inhabitant of the Lefortian or Levinasian 
communal sphere does not aspire to total knowledge and impartial vision with which he can 
supposedly perceive a foundation unifying the social world. Such knowledge and vision 
eliminate otherness that which is unamenable to the would-be unity. Rather the 
disappearance of certainty that calls us into social and communal space, obliges us to be 
what Levinas calls “non-indifferent to the appearance of the other”. Non-indifference 
designates an ability to respond in ethical responsibility, that for Levinas is the essence of the 
reasonable being in man.  
 
The concept of non-indifference is part of an ethical political discourse that differs from 
tradition discourses of morality. Here is how Levinas distinguishes his ethical philosophy 
from other meditations on morality:  
 
“Let us say very schematically that one begins habitually with the universality of 
the moral law, the great Kantian idea. For Kant it was a matter of re-attaching 
ethics to a rationale principle, the universality of the maxim of action being for 
Kant the criterion of moral value. My manner of approaching the question is in 
fact different. It takes off from the idea that ethics arise in the relation to the 
other and not straight away by reference to the universality of a law.” (Levinas, 
Totality and Infinity, pg 45).  
 
Morality is a discourse of certainty, while the ethical political is incompatible with moral 
certainty, for responsiveness to the face of the other, turns us away from our narcissism. 
Interestingly in our context Levinas links responsiveness to vision, but also and more 
significantly he links it to a critique of vision. A word (vision) he surrounds in scare quotes, 
alerting us to dangers of the relations it signifies. “Ethics is an optics”, writes Levinas, but he 
continues, “it is a vision without image, bereft of the synoptic and totalising objectifying 
virtues of vision. A relation of a wholly different type.” (end quote). Communal vision on 
this account foregoes totalising and objectifying images. Levinas, Like Lefort marks a 
departure from traditional, if critical accounts, of the communal sphere, which assume that 
being in relation means aspiring to impartial vision which siezes the totality.  
 
If philosophers and those who deal in the criticality of images have deepened and extended 
the communal sphere of appearances one component of their task has been the promotion 
of vision without image of, that is, non-indifferent ways of seeing. And because non-
indifferent vision obliges the subject to call itself into question, thinkers who explore its 
possibility take part in the psychic subjective transformation, which like material 
transformation is an essential component rather than mere epiphenomenon of social change.  
 
As I hope has become clear, however, furthering non-indifference is not simply a matter of 
producing images, films for instance, that go against any main-stream symbolic transaction 
and hence, the alternative image of those subjects that have been rendered invisible in the 
existing social sphere of appearance. That is, of making true images of these groups in order 
to counteract false ones. For as we have seen, and as Judith Butler argues, Levinas’s face of 
the other is precisely that which is lost when caught by the image, when seen as image. We 
have arrived at a final question: How can the encounter with screen space develop the 
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experience of being ethical by aiding the appearance of others while also making visible the 
limits the face places on the success of any representation? Limits that are the conditions of 
appearance. 
 
[IF I WERE TO DO A READING OF A FILM? SECRET LIFE OF WORDS, IT 
WOULD BE PLACED HERE] 
Consider this film that in someway goes toward a struggle with an ethics of the image. 
 
Witness by Proxy— The psychoanalytic space of ethics: 
Let me suggest a possible discourse that describes a relation of the screen and the viewer as 
one of witness. A witness not of proof but of testimony, which I would like to now 
correspond to the psychoanalytic clinical experience. What we will come to describe here as 
a witness by proxy. Perhaps, this is my radical contribution today in a possible positioning of 
transference in an interstitial zone.  
 
The screen-space develops the viewer’s experience of being communal or social by 
facilitating the appearance of the face of the other. Though it may seem odd to use the term 
face, even whimsical, to bring up the face in connection both a film whose character is blind 
and further to a community that shows no faces of an audience and what is more, and 
emphasises its failure to do so. But the lack of faces is precisely its point, for as we have 
seen, Levinas’s face is not the literal face, but precisely that which alludes the grasp of full 
knowledge and vision; In approaching, in appearing the face exceeds what can be seen, 
rather Levinas says “the face speaks”. [BRING IN SAYING AND THE SAID] The face 
exceeds vision, insofar as vision is, and again in Levinas’s words “a search for adequation”. 
Indeed the face cries out for inadequate vision, which is to say, response.  
 
Insisting on inadequate vision the FILM was influenced by and belongs within a tradition of 
visual arts that was informed by feminist critiques of representation. Visual art that produces 
critical images whose goal is to undo masculinist ones. Those driven by ideals of the 
subject’s adequacy, impartiality, completeness. Critical images set up a relation of non-
indifference to the other, promoting a vision without image. Here feminism opens onto 
human rights, at least a notion of human rights that takes its point of departure from La 
Fort, who, to repeat myself wrote that “the French and American declarations of the rights 
of man made an enigma of both society and right. That enigma, remember, arises from 
uncertainty about the basis of society and of right. It brings us into the social space and 
exposes us to the appearance of others. If we accept, rather than try to evade the enigma, the 
rights of man implies that, as Levinas puts it, “consciousness of the rights of the other man, 
whom I am answerable”.  
 
Answering is urgent for the survival of the social sphere, or perhaps, I should say the 
‘curvature of inter-subjective space’ based on ‘relations without relations’. For if one current 
task of the producers of critical images and for that matter the visual historian and critic, in 
developing the experience of being ethical is to establish new and non-indifferent modes of 
seeing. This task urges us to counter the ways of seeing promoted by the symbolic sphere of 
appearance that is the Corporatised mass-media. Writing recently about the role of the 
cultural critic about the US etc war on terrorism, Judith Butler suggests something similar “If 
cultural criticism has a task at the present moment, says Butler, it is no doubt to return us to 
the human where we would not expect to find it. We would have to interrogate the 
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emergence and the vanishing of the human at the limits of what we can know, at what we 
can hear, what we can see, what we can sense.”  
 
The limits of what we can know, what we can hear, what we can see and what we can sense, 
Butler is describing Levinas’s face understood as the cry of human suffering that demands 
response. Butler contrasts Levinas’s use of the face, with the dominant medias literal use of 
faces in ways that may be humanising or dehumanising, but in either case, cover over 
suffering. The dehumanised faces of Osama Bin Larden, Yosof Arafat and Sadam Hussien, 
says Butler, have been deployed to encourage disidentification with the Arab World. At the 
same time the unveiled faces of young Afghan women liberated from the Berkah humanised 
the war, but do so in manner that symbolises the successful importation of American 
culture. Presented as either the spoils of war or the targets of war, faces like these marshalled 
in the service of war, silence the suffering over war. Butler calls them triumphalist images 
not just because American triumph is their thematic content or subtext but because, like 
what I have called masculinist images, they disavowal the failure of representation and thus 
blot out the appearance of the face.  
 
By contrast critical images promote non-indifferent vision. In doing so they contribute to the 
transformation, not only of the blind-eye, but the deaf ear. In this regard, the transformative 
potential of critical images can engage its viewers’ in a kind of seeing and listening, known as 
witnessing. An activity that seems crucial in our time of collective, human inflicted traumas, 
such as war, that call out for witnesses.  
 
Philosophers like Giorgio Agamben have theorised the position of the witness as the basis 
of ethical political relations, insofar as the witness answers to the suffering of others without 
usurping the place of the other. Primo Levis, writing about himself as a survivor witness of 
Auschwitz, inaugurated the discourse about witnessing as a way of being for the other. When 
he insisted that the survivor of Auschwitz himself isn’t a complete witness since he or she 
didn’t undergo the complete experience of Auschwitz, which was an experience of death. 
The survivor witness says Levi, is a witness by proxy; a witness for the other. For in the case 
of Auschwitz, the Musselman; the malnourished inmates who were dead in life. Since by 
definition the complete witness is the one that cannot speak. Levi’s account blurs the 
distinction between primary witnesses; those that testify to a traumatic event that they lived 
through and secondary witness; those who observe the testimony of the primary witness. He 
makes himself a secondary witness who performs the gesture that Levinas describes as 
“seeding one’s place to the other.”  
 
SAY SOMETHING ABOUT THE FILM & WITNESS BY PROXY OF JOSEF THE 
BLINDED WITNESS TO HANNAH’S TRAUMATIC EXPERIENCE … NOTE THAT 
HANNAH CONSTRUCTS AN OTHER “FICTIVE” WITNESS (BY PROXY) BEFORE 
AND DURING HER TELLING. 
 
 
Like vision without image, witnessing is a way of seeing that challenges the subject’s mastery 
since it requires an acceptance of vulnerability. As Cathy Caruth argues in her book Trauma 
Explorations in Memory (1995), to bear witness to the truth of suffering over a traumatic event, 
is to bear witness to that event’s incomprehensibility. By definition the traumatic event that’s 
caused suffering has not been fully known or experienced. The victim suffers from 
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incomprehension. Taking Freud as her starting point, Caruth, says to know trauma is to 
understand too much and therefore to betray the victim. This poses a problem for 
representations that want to respond to the suffering of others. While traumatic suffering 
calls out for the event to be witnessed, it creates a need for a new kind of witnessing. The 
witnessing of an impossibility. Witnessing in the ethical sense of answerability, thus requires 
a critique of triumphalist images based on notions of representational adequacy. 
 
IF I’M TO INTRODUCE THIS I NEED TO TALK ABOUT THE AUDIENCE WHO 
WATCHES A FILM ABOUT AN EXPERIENCE THEY MAY HAVE EXPERIENCED 
(SURVIVED):  
“THE SECRET LIFE OF WORDS” FILM / Projections as works as a work of therapy in its 
notion of witness by proxy. In this sense it refers to therapy for a troubled society through 
its mnemonic representations and also refers to therapy for remembering the atrocity of war 
on communities of people. In this sense, the film space through its telling of a silent ruined 
condition resemble people who have been rendered silent both by historic trauma and 
historic and present indifference. Like Hannah who was unable to speak of her identity 
when confronted by the initial blindness (both literal and emotional) of her patient, Josef 
who is limited by his own suffering. 
 
The critical handling of the film’s imagery answers silently to the status of a speaking subject, 
calling out of its mute condition, talking and engaging in ethically in relation with it, like a 
psychoanalyst. The projection also helped the human victim speak by highlighting the 
supplemental language of her gesturing hands that care for her patient, while withdrawing 
from a seeing that is mapped out by gestures of recognition akin to a unity of a met gaze. In 
this sense the film protects the speakers, both the true witnesses who sit outside this film 
space yet has experienced (survived) the trauma of war first hand, and from the grasp of 
vision with image; vision that knows too much and so betrays the speaker. In this way the 
screen space facilitates the appearance of the face and offers the viewer the position of 
witness, whose inadequate vision permits her to respond to the cry of suffering. 
 
Trauma; an ethical language 
To repeat myself, the non-phenomenon of the face as that which cannot be contained in 
consciousness is a shift from phenomenology to what Levinas describes as an “ethical 
language”. A language made from some strange and hyperbolic terms such as persecution, 
obsession, substitution, hostage and trauma. As Critchley notes: “Levinas makes the extreme claim 
that my relation to the other is not some benign benevolence, compassionate care or respect 
for the other’s autonomy, but is obsessive experience of a responsibility that persecutes me 
with its sheer weight. I am the other’s hostage, taken by them and prepared to substitute 
myself for any suffering and humiliation that they may undergo. I am responsible for the 
persecution I undergo and even for my persecutor; a claim that, given the experience of 
Levinas’s family and people during the WWII, is nothing less than extraordinary. Trauma was 
not a theoretical issue for Levinas, but a way of dealing with the memory of the horror. 
Levinas describes the relation of the infinite responsibility to the other as trauma. (Critchley, 
p.61) 
 
The ethical demand is a traumatic demand. Further, for Levinas, responsibility, begins with a 
subject approving of a demand that it can never meet, a one-sided, radical and unfulfillable 
demand: “To be I signifies not being able to escape responsibility’ or again, ‘to be a ‘self’ is 
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to be responsible before having done anything”. I, as it were, decide to be a subject that I 
know I cannot be. I give myself up to a demand that makes an imprint upon me without my 
ever being able to understand it; beyond comprehension. I am an existential exaggeration. 
This is why Levinas’s main thesis is an ethics before being; it is an excess of ontology; of 
being.  
 
To bring our hypothesis closer to Lacan; The ethical subject is defined by the approval of a 
traumatic heteronomous demand at its heart. But, importantly, the subject is also divided by 
this demand, it is constitutively split between itself and a demand that it cannot meet, but 
which is that by virtue of which it becomes a subject. The ethical subject is a split subject (a 
split that is asymmetrical of course). 
 
Lacan – An Ethical Acknowlegement: In excess of Knowledge 
Earlier, I mention that for Lacan in Seminar VII The Ethics of Psychoanalysis ethics is 
articulated in relation to the order of the real and further the real is that which always come 
back to the same place; the limit of all symbolization. The basic thought here is that the real 
is that which exceeds and resists the subject’s powers of conceptualization or the reach of its 
criteria. The thesis here is that ethics is articulated in relation to the order of the real insofar 
as the real is the guarantor of what Lacan calls das Ding, the Thing. Ethics is a relation to the 
real and what stands in the place of the real is the Thing.  
 
What exactly is the Thing? The main example of the Thing in the ethics seminar is Freud’s 
figure of the Nebenmensch, the fellow human being or neighbour. Everything turns on the 
interpretation of a single passage from Freud’s early 1985 Project for a Scientific Psychology. Let 
me paraphrase the key passage: Freud talks about the complex of the fellow human being’ or 
even ‘the neighbour complex’. This complex breaks down into two components, Freud says. 
One the one hand, if I look at another human being, say someone I know well, then there 
are things about him or her that I understand and that I can describe, such as facial features, 
mannerisms, tone of voice, etc. However, Freud goes on to claim that there is something 
about the neighbour that escapes my comprehension and which stands apart from me, als 
Ding, as a Thing. Therefore, as well as I might know someone, even someone I share my life 
with, there is a dimension of Thingly Secrecy about them that I cannot know. In his 
commentary on this passage from Freud, Lacan writes, ‘The Ding is the element that is 
initially isolated by the subject in his experience of the Nebenmensch as being by its very nature 
alien, Fremde.’ What interests Lacan is the idea of the Thingliness of the other person is 
something alien to me but which is located at the core of my subjectivity. The Thing is, we 
might say, the excluded interior, where I discover that what is most interior to my interiority 
is exterior to me, it is ‘something strange to me, although it is at the heart of me.’ (i.e the 
uncanny, host as hostage, welcoming the stranger etc).  
 
How can I ever know the other person is in pain? I cannot. That is to say, there is something 
abut the other person, a dimension of separateness, Thingly secrecy or what Levinas calls 
‘alterity’ that escapes my comprehension. That which exceeds the bounds of my knowledge 
demands acknowledgement. An acknowledgement that in the clinical setting and indeed my 
collapse of being with others engaging the trauma of the image, we might describe as witness 
by proxy. As previously suggested, while traumatic suffering calls out for the event to be 
witnessed, it creates a need for a new kind of witnessing. The witnessing of an impossibility. 
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Witnessing in the ethical sense of acknowledgement, thus requires a critique of our role of 
participating with triumphalist images based on notions of representational adequacy. 
 
There is a neighbour or nebenmensch intricacy at work in both Levinas and Lacan. For both of 
them, ethical experience begins with a heteronomous demand, the infinite demand of the 
other’s face in Levinas, the demand of the fellow human being who stands in the place of 
the real in Lacan. Furthermore, the demand of the Thing lodges itself at the heart of me, as 
the excluded interior. We might think here of the Thing as a traumatic mark within the 
subject, yet foreign to it. It is a mark that as mentioned earlier, is by definition the traumatic 
event that caused suffering that has not been fully known or experienced. The victim suffers 
from incomprehension and we are witnesses to this incomprehension, by proxy, by 
acknowledgement of the limit to our knowledge. 
 
One might say that the psychoanalytic experience begins with the recognition of the demand 
of the unconscious, the impingement of the fact of unconscious desire in the form of the 
symptom. In the analytic situation, that is, if the analysand has agreed to the interpretation of 
the symptom, the fact of this desire provokes an act of approval of the part of the subject. 
That is, the subject decides henceforth to relate itself approvingly to the demand of its 
unconscious desire. This demand produces what I see as the categorical imperative of 
Lacanian ethics and which is the motto of The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, ‘do not give way on its 
desire’ (‘ne pas céder sur son désir). That is, do not cease to approve of the demand of 
unconscious desire in the activity of its interpretation. For Lacan, it is this act of approval 
that founds the subject, where he claims that ‘tout le cheminement du sujet’, the entire itinerary of 
the subject, articulates itself around the Thing that casts its shadow across it. Thus, 
psychoanalysis has the ethical goal of putting the subject in relation to its desire. This is why 
Lacan can claim that Freudian psychoanalysis, as much as Kant’s critical philosophy, 
subscribes to the primacy of practical reason. The difference between Lacan and Kant, like 
that between Levinas and Kant, lies in the gap between the heteronomous and autonomous 
determinations of the ethical subject. The unconscious is not a law that I wilfully give myself, 
it is a law to which I am involuntarily given. The ethical question is ultimately how I 
transmute the passion of the unconscious.2 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
2 Critchley is concerned that Levinasian ethics with its focus on trauma risks amounting to nothing les than 
a long philosophical suicide note or at the very least an invitation to some fairly brutal moral masochism. In 
his view, thinking of the work of Melanie Klein, the trauma of separation requires reparation, the ethical 
tear requires repair in a work of sublimation that would be a work of love. In other words, Levinas risks 
producing an ethics without sublimation, which risks being disastrously self-destructive to the subject.  
